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Abstract Disordered gambling in young adults is hypothesized as being related to
mistaken gambling-related cognitions. Few studies have examined the temporal order of
this relationship using longitudinal data. The purpose of this study is to understand the
directionality of the relationship between gambling cognitions and gambling severity in a
longitudinal sample of young adults. Young adults (N = 578), initially aged 18–21 years,
completed the Manitoba Longitudinal Survey of Young Adults at two time points
approximately 2–3 years apart. Measures of beliefs about randomness related to gambling
and gambling severity, as measured by the Problem Gambling Severity Index, were uti-
lized. A cross-sectional relationship between gambling severity and gambling-related
cognitions was observed with greater gambling severity being associated with increased
endorsement of mistaken cognitions. Evidence for a bidirectional longitudinal relationship
was observed with faulty gambling cognitions leading to later problematic gambling
behaviors and vice versa when examining a total beliefs scale. When examining specific
beliefs about randomness, initial gambling group membership predicted later endorsement
of certain beliefs about randomness while initial belief ratings did not impact later gam-
bling group membership. The results of this study suggest a bidirectional relationship
between gambling severity and erroneous gambling-related cognitions. However, when
examining specific beliefs about randomness, evidence was found for problem gambling
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behaviors leading to erroneous gambling beliefs. These findings suggest that prevention
efforts targeting cognitions may not be as effective in impacting those not yet demon-
strating disordered gambling behaviors.
Keywords Pathological gambling  Young adult gambling  Gambling cognitions 
Longitudinal gambling research  Gambling development  Gambling severity
Introduction
Studies of pathological and at-risk gambling have identified gambling at younger ages as a
risk factor in the development of a gambling problem (Derevensky et al. 2003). Research
on gambling in young adults (19–25 year olds) has found 67–97 % of this age group
participated in some form of gambling (Clarke 2003; Engwall et al. 2004) with prevalence
rates estimating that 5 % of young adults are pathological gamblers (Shaffer et al. 1999), a
rate of three times higher than the general population (Shaffer and Hall 2000; Shaffer et al.
1997; Volberg 1996). This is particularly problematic as problem gambling during young
adulthood is associated with a number of negative consequences, including poor academic
performance, depression, suicide, and the development of multiple addictions (Afifi et al.
2016; Engwall et al. 2004; Ladouceur et al. 1994; Lesieur et al. 1991; Stuhldreher et al.
2007).
The high prevalence of problem gambling found in young adults and its negative
implications has led to greater efforts to identify the factors underlying it, with faulty
gambling cognitions being identified as a risk factor in the development of problem
gambling behaviors (Clarke 2003; Engwall et al. 2004; Stuhldreher et al. 2007). Faulty
gambling cognitions focus on the gambler’s own beliefs regarding their control or influ-
ence over gambling outcomes (Joukhador et al. 2003) with many gamblers believing they
have some degree of control when, in fact, most forms of gambling capitalize on ran-
domness. Other forms of these distorted cognitions include denial, superstition, and
overconfidence in perceived skill. While problem gamblers mistakenly attribute their
winnings to internal factors such as superstitious behaviour and perceived skill, losses are
explained away as result of external factors (Ladouceur et al. 1988; Langer 1975;
Wagenaar 1988).
Extending from examinations of behaviors, recent research has demonstrated a positive
relationship between gambling severity and gambling cognitions (Lakey et al. 2007;
MacKay and Hodgins 2012; Oei et al. 2008). Pathological gamblers frequently endorse
erroneous gambling beliefs leading to overconfidence in their bets and have demonstrated a
short-term focus on rewards with insensitivity to future consequences (Lakey et al. 2007).
Further, these gambling cognitions significantly predicted pathology according to DSM-IV
criteria (Lakey et al. 2007). This association between faulty gambling cognitions and
gambling severity extends to pathological or at-risk gambling behaviors in young adults
(e.g., Hardoon and Derevensky 2002; Moodie 2008; Moore and Ohtsuka 1999). Research
on young adult gamblers has shown a significant association between problem gambling
severity and faulty cognitions with problem gamblers endorsing higher rates in their belief
of luck, more positive attitudes towards gambling, and more erroneous beliefs on luck and
perseverance than non-problem gamblers (Chiu and Storm 2010; MacKillop et al. 2006).
While these studies demonstrate a significant association between faulty gambling
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cognitions and gambling severity in young adults, the research conducted to this point has
largely been limited to using cross-sectional data (e.g., Ladouceur 2004; MacKay and
Hodgins 2012; May et al. 2005), with few longitudinal studies conducted (Grant et al.
2012; Harvanko et al. 2013).
Complicating the relationship between faulty cognitions and gambling severity, some
studies have found that irrational gambling cognitions have no effect on gambling
behaviors while gambling (Cronce and Corbin 2010; Ellery and Stewart 2014; May et al.
2005). Specifically, changes to gambling cognitions of gamblers did not affect the number
of bets made during the gambling session, total amount of money won or lost during the
session, total amount of money wagered during the session, average amount of money won
or lost per bet, or average amount of money wagered per bet (May et al. 2005). This finding
suggests that factors apart from faulty cognitions must be considered in the development of
problem gambling behaviors. However, change in illusion of control was relatively small,
which may explain the lack of change in gambling behavior. Further, and perhaps more
importantly, the sample utilized largely non-problem gamblers who did not exhibit risky
gambling behaviors or patterns.
Further inconsistencies in the research literature cast doubt on whether irrational cog-
nitions about gambling leading to increased gambling severity, with some suggesting that
increased problem gambling behaviors precede the development of irrational beliefs about
gambling (Ellery and Stewart 2014). In support of this view, it has been shown that
winning during a gambling session increases the endorsement of irrational beliefs about
gambling (Monaghan et al. 2010).
A potential reasoning for the discrepant findings within the belief versus severity
research may be related to within play tendencies. Many of the articles previously
described (e.g., Ellery and Stewart 2014; May et al. 2005; Monaghan et al. 2010) examined
the changes in beliefs during a single session of gambling rather than the long-term
development of severity or belief changes over a longer span. These discrepant findings
suggest that further research is needed to better understand the directionality of the rela-
tionship between gambling cognitions and problem gambling severity.
Present Study
The current study aims to clarify inconsistencies within the gambling literature about the
directionality of the relationship between gambling cognitions and gambling severity by
analyzing the development of gambling beliefs, attitudes, and fallacies over time and
comparing this development to the development of gambling problems over time. This
study examined the gambling severity and gambling related cognitions of young adults
from Manitoba at two time periods approximately two-to-3 years apart.
Research Questions
1. Are gambling problems associated with faulty gambling cognitions cross-sectionally?
2. Do gambling problems predict later faulty gambling cognitions, after adjusting for
initial cognitions?
3. Do faulty gambling cognitions predict later gambling problems, after adjusting for
initial gambling problems?




The current study utilized data from the Manitoba Longitudinal Study of Young Adults
(MLSYA). The MLSYA dataset was created through the collaboration between the
Manitoba Gaming Control Commission, the Addictions Foundation of Manitoba, and the
Manitoba Lotteries Corporation. Young adults from Manitoba, aged 18–20 at baseline,
were surveyed at four time points across a 5-year span from 2007 to 2011. Initially, 679
young adults complete the survey at the first time point. Of the 679 participants to complete
the study at baseline, 578 (85.1 %) went on to complete the survey at both baseline and
follow-up and, therefore, met inclusion criteria.
At baseline, participants were 18 (35.6 %), 19 (36.8 %), or 20 (27.5 %) years old with a
mean age of 18.9 years. At follow-up, 24.9 % of participants were 20 years old, 36.9 %
were 21, 31.1 % were 22, and 7.1 % were 23 years old or more. The mean age at follow-up
was 21.2 years. At baseline, 51.8 % of the sample was female. The mean age of males and
female at baseline were 18.96 years (SD = 0.78) and 18.88 years (SD = 0.80) respec-
tively. Sociodemographic characteristic differences by gambling severity at baseline were
only found for sex and main activity in the past 12 months, with males being more likely to
be a moderate or severe risk gamblers and those working or indicating other as their main
activity as being more likely to be a moderate or severe risk gambler (see Table 2).
Procedure
Respondents were recruited through convenience, random, and snowball sampling.
Specific sampling procedures utilized by the MLSYA included random-digit dialing,
internet advertising, and advertisements in casinos, VLT locations, and post-secondary
institutions. In addition, participants were asked for potential referrals post-interview. The
characteristics of the young adults at baseline of the MLSYA was similar to the
sociodemographic characteristics of Manitobans aged 18–20 years, with the exception of
MLSYA participants noting slightly higher education and residing predominantly in urban
areas. A two-part survey was administered to respondents during Cycle 1, with the first part
consisting of a telephone interview and the second part involving the respondents’ choice
of an online or mail-in questionnaire. Telephone interviews were utilized in the follow-up
surveys (i.e., Cycles 2–4).
The MLSYA includes data from four time points, or cycles, over a 5-year period from
2007 to 2011. Measures related to gambling were assessed at Cycle 1 (in 2007) and Cycle 3
(2009–2010) only. For the purposes of this study, Cycle 1 and 3 are referred to as baseline




The MLSYA questionnaire collected participants’ sociodemographic information includ-
ing age, gender, marital status, main activity engaged in over the past year (e.g., work or
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school), religion, self-identified ethnicity, and total household income in the past
12 months.
Gambling Problems
This research utilized the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), a subscale of the
Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI), to assess past 12-month prevalence of problem
gambling. The PGSI uses nine items to assess the severity of gambling problems: (1)
wagered larger amounts to get the same feeling of excitement, (2) tried to win back losses,
(3) borrowed money or sold something to get money for gambling, (4) felt you might have
a problem with gambling, (5) gambling caused health problems including stress and
anxiety, (6) been criticized for your betting or told that you have a problem, (7) gambling
has caused financial problems, (8) felt guilty about gambling, and (9) bet more than you
could afford to lose. The respondent indicates how frequent each of the above behaviors or
problems occurred during the past 12 months: never, sometimes, most of the time, or
almost always.
Previous psychometric testing of the PGSI established specific categories of gamblers
based on their scores. Those who did not gamble at least five times in the past year were
noted as being non-gamblers. Of those who did gamble the requisite frequency in the past
12 months, four categories were created, consisting of non-problem gamblers (score of
zero), low risk gamblers (score of one to two), moderate risk gamblers (score of three to
seven), and severe risk gamblers (score of eight or more) (Ferris and Wynne 2001a, b).
While the developers of the PGSI indicate low- and moderate-risk as distinct groups with
unique cut-off points and associated characteristics, other research on the PGSI suggests
the two groups lack meaningful contrast and should be merged into one group (Currie et al.
2013). For the purposes of this study, we utilized the cut-off points more reflective of the
original Ferris and Wynne designations. Therefore, this study utilized two gambling cat-
egories: ‘non-gamblers and low-risk gamblers’ (i.e., non-gamblers, non-problem gamblers
scoring zero on the PGSI, and low-risk gamblers scoring 1 or 2 on the PGSI) and par-
ticipants indicating three or more problem gambling symptoms according to the PGSI (i.e.,
moderate and severe risk gamblers) termed ‘moderate to severe risk gamblers’.
Gambling Beliefs and Attitudes
To examine gambling beliefs, attitudes, and fallacies, data collected using the Manitoba
Gaming Control Commission’s (MGCC) gambling attitudes and fallacies questionnaire
(MGCC 2007) and the Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (Wood and Clapham 2005)
was employed. The MGCC questionnaire was created by the Gaming Commission as a
means of assessing whether participants ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with erroneous gambling
statements about randomness. These items include ‘Odds of winning on a slot machine
change as you are playing’, ‘A series of numbers like 12–5–23–7 is more likely to win than
1–2–3–4’, and ‘Staying at the same slot machine will improve your chances of winning’.
The items on the MGCC questionnaire and individual item mean and standard deviation
scores are listed in Table 1.
The Drake Beliefs About Chance Inventory (Wood and Clapham 2005) is a 22-item
survey designed to assess two commonly observed areas of faulty gambling cognitions:
superstition and illusion of control. Responses to items were given on a 5-point Likert scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Examples of items included to assess
superstition include ‘I can improve my chances of winning by performing specific rituals’,
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and ‘I believe that fate is against me when I lose’. Examples of items from the illusion of
control subscale include ‘There are secrets to successful casino gambling that can be
learned’, or ‘One should pay attention to lottery numbers that often win’. Of the 22-items,
half made up the superstition subscale while the other half comprised the illusion of control
subscale. Individual items from the MGCC questionnaire and the superstition subscale
score, the illusion of control subscale score, and the total score of the Drake inventory were
examined in the analyses. Subscale score means and standard deviations for baseline and
follow-up are located in Table 1.
Statistical Analyses
Descriptive statistics at baseline were examined for sociodemographic variables among
‘non-gamblers and low-risk gamblers’ and ‘moderate- to severe-risk gamblers’. Cross-
sectional logistic regressions were utilized to examine the strength of the relationship
between baseline cognition ratings/responses and baseline gambling group membership.
Models were run without adjusting for any other variables (unadjusted Odds Ratios, OR)
and again with adjustment for sociodemographic variables (Adjusted Odds Ratios, AOR).
Logistic regressions analyses were conducted to assess for a temporal relationship
between gambling group and faulty gambling cognitions. Unadjusted models, models
adjusting for sociodemographic variables (AOR-1), and models adjusting for both
Table 1 Beliefs about randomness surveyed in the MLSYA





BAR 1 The odds of winning on a slot machine
change as you are playing
0.25 (0.44) 0.13 (0.34)
BAR 2 It is important to understand exactly how a
slot machine or VLT works in order to
play better
0.39 (0.49) 0.23 (0.42)
BAR 3 Having a system when playing slot machines
or VLTs increases the chances of winning
0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.31)
BAR 4 Staying at the same slot machine or VLT
will improve your chances of winning
0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.24)
BAR 5 If you have been losing for a while, odds are
you are due for a win
0.11 (0.31) 0.05 (0.22)
BAR 6 If you flip a coin and get heads five times in
a row, your next flip is likely to be tails
0.21 (0.41) 0.10 (0.31)
BAR 7 A series of numbers such as 12–5–23–7 is
more likely to win than a series of numbers
like 1–2–3–4
0.23 (0.42) 0.11 (0.32)
Drake Total Beliefs Scale 41.18 (13.94) 37.28 (13.64)
Drake Superstition
Subscale
e.g., ‘I can improve my chances of winning
by performing specific rituals’. or ‘I
believe that fate is against me when I lose’
20.07 (7.68) 18.44 (7.49)
Drake Illusion of Control
Subscale
e.g., ‘There are secrets to successful casino
gambling that can be learned’. or ‘One
should pay attention to lottery numbers
that often win’
21.11 (8.11) 18.84 (7.85)
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sociodemographic variables and initial group membership or cognition responses (AOR-
2) were conducted.
Results
At baseline (N = 679), 11.5 % of the sample reported not participating in the prerequisite
number of gambling activities in the past year, 57.0 % were non-problem gamblers (PGSI
score of 0), 20.8 % were low-risk gamblers (score of 1–2), 9.3 % were moderate-risk
gamblers (score of 3–7), and 1.5 % were problem gamblers (score of 8 or more). When
examining the collapsed gambling groups, 89.2 % of the respondents were non-gamblers
or low-risk gamblers (i.e., score of 2 or less) while 10.8 % were moderate to severe risk
gamblers (i.e., score of 3 or more). At follow-up (N = 578), 8.5 % of respondents did not
gamble at least five times in the past year while 71.8 % were non-problem gamblers,
13.5 % were low-risk gamblers, 4.7 % were moderate-risk gamblers, and the remaining
1.6 % fell into the severe-risk gambler category.
The sociodemographic variables of the gambling groups are presented in Table 2.
Differences between the two gambling groups were observed in sex and main activity
engaged in over the past year. Males were more likely to be a moderate to severe risk
gambler (64.4 %) compared to females (35.6 %). Moderate to severe risk gamblers,
compared to non-gamblers and low-risk gamblers, were more likely to report work (35.6
vs. 25.4 %) as their main activity and less likely to their report main activity as school
(57.5 vs. 71.3 %).
The results of the cross-sectional regression analyses are displayed in Table 3. The
results indicate that moderate to severe risk gamblers, when compared to non-gamblers and
low-risk gamblers, are more likely to report certain faulty gambling cognitions. Those in
the moderate to severe risk gambler group were more likely than the non-gamblers and
low-risk gambling group to endorse a faulty gambling cognition about randomness in four
of the seven beliefs about randomness assessed after adjusting for sociodemographic
factors. Similarly, scores on the overall Drake Total Beliefs scale and both the Superstition
and Illusion of Control subscales were reflective of gambling-related cognitive errors in
moderate to severe risk gamblers compared to non-gamblers and low-risk gamblers.
Table 4 displays the regression results examining the association between gambling
group membership at baseline and reported faulty gambling cognitions at follow-up. After
adjusting for sociodemographic factors, the endorsement of four out of seven beliefs about
randomness at follow-up differed between the two baseline gambling groups. The
endorsement of BAR5, ‘If you have been losing for a while, odds are you are due for a
win’, (AOR2 = 3.18; 95 % CI 1.23–8.96) significantly differed between the two baseline
gambling groups after adjusting for both sociodemographic factors and respective reported
BAR scores at baseline. The Drake Total Beliefs scale and both the Superstition and the
Illusion of Control subscales were significantly different at follow-up between the two
baseline gambling groups at follow-up after being adjusted for sociodemographic factors.
After adjusting for baseline belief endorsement, only the follow-up Drake Superstition
subscale scores demonstrated a difference between baseline gambling groups [adjusted
unstandardized B coefficient-2 (AB-2) = 1.87; 95 % CI 0.16–3.57].
The logistic regression results examining baseline gambling cognitions leading to fol-
low-up gambling group membership is shown in Table 5. None of the beliefs about ran-
domness items at baseline predicted later gambling group membership at follow-up in any
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of the models examined. The Drake Total Beliefs scale and the Superstition and Illusion of
Control subscales all predicted later gambling group membership after adjusting for
sociodemographic characteristics in the first adjusted models (AOR); however, these
relationships did not remain significant after adjusting for gambling group membership at
baseline in the second adjusted models (AOR-2).
Table 2 Sociodemographic variables of gambling group membership at baseline
Non-gambler or non-problem
gambler (N = 606; 89.2 %)
At-risk or problem gamblers
(N = 73; 10.8 %)
Marital status v2 = 0.489, p = .783
Single (never married) 400 (66.0 %) 51 (69.9 %)
In a relationship 194 (32.0 %) 21 (28.8 %)
Married/common-law 12 (2.0 %) 1 (1.4 %)
Divorced/separated/widowed – –
Sex v2 = 8.624, p = .003
Female 326 (53.8 %) 26 (35.6 %)
Male 280 (46.2 %) 47 (64.4 %)
Main activity past 12 months v2 = 8.290, p = .040
School 432 (71.3 %) 42 (57.5 %)
Working 154 (25.4 %) 26 (35.6 %)
Looking for work 9 (1.5 %) 1 (1.4 %)
Other 11 (1.8 %) 4 (5.5 %)
Total household income before
taxes—past 12 months
v2 = 5.315, p = .806
\$10,000 9 (1.5 %) 3 (4.1 %)
$10,001–$19,999 5 (0.8 %) 1 (1.4 %)
$20,000–$29,999 18 (3.0 %) 1 (1.4 %)
$30,000–$39,999 14 (2.3 %) 1 (1.4 %)
$40,000–$49,999 15 (2.5 %) 1 (1.4 %)
$50,000–$59,999 20 (3.3 %) 2 (2.7 %)
$60,000–$79,999 44 (7.3 %) 3 (4.1 %)
$80,000–$99,999 39 (6.4 %) 6 (8.2 %)
$100,000? 177 (29.2 %) 22 (30.1 %)
DK/NR 265 (43.7 %) 33 (45.2 %)
First identified ethnic group (other
than Canadian)
v2 = 1.671, p = .643
European 417 (68.8 %) 47 (64.4 %)
Asian 50 (8.3 %) 9 (12.3 %)
Other 90 (14.9 %) 10 (13.7 %)
DK/NR 49 (8.1 %) 7 (9.6 %)
Religion v2 = 1.859, p = .762
No religion/agnostic/atheist 235 (38.8 %) 29 (39.7 %)
Christian 106 (17.5 %) 10 (13.7 %)
Roman Catholic 87 (14.4 %) 12 (16.4 %)
All others 165 (27.2 %) 19 (26.0 %)
DK/NR 13 (2.1 %) 3 (4.1 %)
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Discussion
Consistent with previous research, gambling severity was found to be associated with
faulty gambling cognitions in a cross-sectional analysis. Longitudinal analyses provide
evidence for a directional relationship between initial gambling severity group membership
and specific later faulty gambling cognition endorsements, In contrast, the ratings for the
beliefs about randomness variables showed no relationship between initial faulty gambling
cognition endorsement and later gambling severity group membership. These results
suggest that, over time, those with moderate to severe risk gambling behaviors may be
associated with an increased likelihood of erroneous concepts around gambling and
associated odds.
The research literature has extensively demonstrated a positive relationship between
faulty gambling cognitions and increased gambling severity (Lakey et al. 2007; MacKay
and Hodgins 2012; Oei et al. 2008). Overall, problem gamblers have consistently shown to
hold more faulty cognitions related to luck, superstition, and illusion of control than non-
problem gamblers (Oei et al. 2008). While this relationship has been well established,
evidence for the directionality of the relationship to this point has been largely unknown.
Our findings when examining specific beliefs about randomness suggest that early gam-
bling problems are associated with later faulty gambling cognitions, not the opposing
relationship. However, more broad assessments of mistaken cognitions, including super-
stition and illusion of control, suggest that a bidirectional relationship may cause faulty
Table 3 Cross-sectional analysis examining relationship between baseline gambling group membership
and baseline gambling cognition endorsement
Gambling related cognitions At-risk or problem gamblers
OR (95 % CI) AOR (95 % CI)
BAR 1: The odds of winning on a slot machine change as you
are playing
1.21 (0.71–2.08) 1.23 (0.72–2.23)
BAR 2: It is important to understand exactly how a slot
machine or VLT works in order to play better
1.31 (0.80–2.14) 1.36 (0.82–2.26)
BAR 3: Having a system when playing slot machines or
VLTs increases the chances of winning
3.06 (1.66–5.64)*** 2.97 (1.55–5.68)**
BAR 4: Staying at the same slot machine or VLT will
improve your chances of winning
2.44 (1.25–4.75)** 2.60 (1.28–5.28)**
BAR 5: If you have been losing for a while, odds are you are
due for a win
2.20 (1.16–4.17)* 2.38 (1.22–4.66)*
BAR 6: If you flip a coin and get heads 5 times in a row, your
next flip is likely to be tails
2.03 (1.20–3.44)** 2.12 (1.22–3.67)**
BAR 7: A series of numbers such as 12–5–23–7 is more
likely to win than a series of numbers like 1–2–3–4
1.43 (0.83–2.47) 1.36 (0.77–2.41)
Drake Total Beliefs Scale 1.04 (1.02–1.06)*** 1.04 (1.02–1.05)***
Drake Superstition Subscale 1.06 (1.02–1.09)*** 1.06 (1.03–1.09)***
Drake Illusion of Control Subscale 1.06 (1.03–1.10)*** 1.06 (1.03–1.09)***
‘Non-gambler or non-problem gambler’ serves at the reference group. AOR adjusting for sociodemographic
variables (i.e., gender, marital status, main past-year activity, religion, ethnicity, total household income in
past-year)
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
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beliefs to further gambling severity while, simultaneously, increased severity furthers the
development of faulty gambling cognitions.
Previous theories may shed light on this seemingly dual finding. Sharpe (2002) has
theorized a potential pathway to how gambling involvement leads to the development of
faulty gambling cognitions. She proposes that early history (e.g., big wins) and exposure to
gambling leads to the development of these cognitions and the establishment of gambling
behavior. Through classical conditioning, the faulty cognitions are paired with the arousal
and the cues associated with gambling. Overtime, this conditioned response becomes
automatic (McCusker and Gettings 1997). Erroneous gambling beliefs are then unknow-
ingly triggered by cues associated with gambling and, as a result of this learning process,
leads to more frequent and prolonged gambling sessions.
Another theory posits that disordered gambling is a result of erroneous decision-making
based on faulty information processing (Ladouceur and Walker 1996; Sharpe 2002; Sharpe
and Terrier 1993). This cognitive model suggests that problem gamblers have faulty
cognitive heuristics or biases, which leads to the development of problem gambling
Table 4 Longitudinal analysis examining relationship between baseline gambling group membership and
follow-up gambling cognition endorsement
Gambling related cognitions At-risk or problem gamblers
OR (95 % CI) AOR (95 % CI) AOR-2 (95 % CI)
BAR 1: The odds of winning on a slot
machine change as you are playing
2.09 (1.07–4.09)* 2.07 (1.00–4.25)* 2.11 (0.98–4.55)
BAR 2: It is important to understand
exactly how a slot machine or VLT
works in order to play better
1.17 (0.63–2.19) 1.23 (0.64–2.36) 1.21 (0.59–2.48)
BAR 3: Having a system when playing
slot machines or VLTs increases the
chances of winning
2.23 (0.93–5.34) 2.07 (0.79–5.46) 1.79 (0.65–4.97)
BAR 4: Staying at the same slot machine
or VLT will improve your chances of
winning
2.31 (0.97–5.55) 3.18 (1.22–8.28)* 2.65 (0.97–7.26)
BAR 5: If you have been losing for a
while, odds are you are due for a win
3.80 (1.60–9.03)** 3.99 (1.55–10.24)** 3.18 (1.23–8.96)*
BAR 6: If you flip a coin and get heads 5
times in a row, your next flip is likely to
be tails
2.24 (1.09–4.60)* 2.47 (1.14–5.36)* 1.98 (0.87–4.51)
BAR 7: A series of numbers such as
12–5–23–7 is more likely to win than a
series of numbers like 1–2–3–4
1.08 (0.47–2.48) 1.33 (0.56–3.20) 1.22 (0.48–3.08)
B (95 % CI) Adjusted B (95 % CI) Adjusted B-2 (95 % CI)
Drake Total Beliefs Scale 6.55 (2.84–10.25)** 6.09 (2.34–9.84)** 2.12 (-0.94 to 5.18)
Drake Superstition Subscale 3.71 (1.68–5.75)*** 3.68 (1.63–5.74)*** 1.87 (0.16 to 3.57)*
Drake Illusion of Control
Subscale
2.83 (0.69–4.98)* 2.41 (0.25–4.56)* 0.51 (-1.31 to 2.34)
‘Non-gambler or non-problem gambler’ serves at the reference group. AOR adjusting for sociodemographic
variables (i.e., gender, marital status, main past-year activity, religion, ethnicity, total household income in
past-year). AOR-2 adjusting for sociodemographic variables and baseline gambling cognition endorsement
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
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behaviors. Similarly, the results of the current study suggest that cognitions may play a role
in both the initiation of problematic gambling behavior and maintenance of problem
gambling behaviors. Previously, gambling cognitions have been found to moderate the
relationship between risky gambling practices and gambling intensity (Miller and Currie
2008). Specifically, these cognitions were found to increase the percentage of income spent
on gambling by individuals who engage in risky behaviors and were associated with
gamblers needing a higher dose (e.g., frequency, intensity) of gambling to be satiated.
Likewise, Delfabbro and Winefield (2000) described a moderating effect of gambling
cognitions whereby non-problem gamblers, with higher rates of faulty gambling cogni-
tions, were more likely to spend a larger amount of money in a gambling session.
Implications
An important implication of this study’s findings pertains to the prevention and treatment
of disordered gambling. Many intervention programs aim to identify and challenge related
cognitions through clinical intervention (Ferland et al. 2002; Ladouceur et al. 2000, 2001,
Table 5 Longitudinal analysis examining relationship between baseline gambling cognition endorsement
and follow-up gambling group membership
Gambling related cognitions At-risk or problem gamblers
OR (95 % CI) AOR (95 % CI) AOR-2 (95 %
CI)
BAR 1: The odds of winning on a slot
machine change as you are playing
0.83 (0.37–1.86) 0.91 (0.38–2.15) 0.78 (0.31–1.96)
BAR 2: It is important to understand exactly
how a slot machine or VLT works in order
to play better
0.87 (0.43–1.74) 0.90 (0.43–1.91) 0.81 (0.36–1.83)
BAR 3: Having a system when playing slot
machines or VLTs increases the chances of
winning
2.16 (0.91–5.12) 2.45 (0.93–6.47) 1.54 (0.53–4.48)
BAR 4: Staying at the same slot machine or
VLT will improve your chances of
winning
1.29 (0.44–3.78) 1.84 (0.55–6.24) 1.28 (0.35–4.69)
BAR 5: If you have been losing for a while,
odds are you are due for a win
1.36 (0.51–3.62) 2.04 (0.70–5.92) 1.22 (0.36–4.12)
BAR 6: If you flip a coin and get heads 5
times in a row, your next flip is likely to be
tails
1.09 (0.48–2.44) 1.53 (0.64–3.64) 1.17 (0.46–2.98)
BAR 7: A series of numbers such as 12–5–
23–7 is more likely to win than a series of
numbers like 1–2–3–4
1.01 (0.45–2.27) 0.94 (0.39–2.22) 0.82 (0.32–2.13)
Drake Total Beliefs Scale 1.04 (1.01–1.06)** 1.03 (1.01–1.06)** 1.02 (1.00–1.05)
Drake Superstition Subscale 1.04 (1.00–1.09)* 1.05 (1.00–1.09)* 1.03 (0.99–1.08)
Drake Illusion of Control Subscale 1.06 (1.03–1.11)** 1.06 (1.01–1.10)* 1.04 (1.00–1.09)
‘Non-gambler or non-problem gambler’ serves at the reference group. AOR adjusting for sociodemographic
variables (i.e., gender, marital status, main past-year activity, religion, ethnicity, total household income in
past-year). AOR-2 adjusting for sociodemographic variables and baseline gambling group membership
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
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2003). The central assumption underlying these cognitive interventions assumes that the
correction of erroneous beliefs will reduce problem gambling. This is supported in the
research literature, where efforts to change cognitions have been more successful in
reducing problematic gambling behaviors rather than preventing future gambling disorders
(Benhsain et al. 2004; Ferland et al. 2002; Ladouceur et al. 2000, 2001, 2003; Williams
et al. 2007).
In problem gambling treatment, cognitive-behavioral therapy has demonstrated suc-
cess with significant reductions in gambling frequency and improved rates of abstinence
among problem gamblers (Toneatto 2005; Toneatto and Millar 2004). Overall, the
results of these cognitive treatment interventions have proved very promising, with
findings that 80 % of problem gamblers successfully reduced their gambling to a non-
problematic level after 12 months of treatment (Ferland et al. 2002; Ladouceur et al.
2000, 2001, 2003). Alternatively, efforts to prevent problem gambling behaviors by
targeting cognitions have found limited success. In a review of current prevention
programs, Williams et al. (2007) concluded that there are many prevention programs
that provide marginal benefits, but there is no gold standard in gambling prevention.
Despite mixed findings of young adults having an accurate understanding of the
probabilities and odds (Delfabbro et al. 2006; Jefferson and Nicki 2003; Joukhador
et al. 2004), evidence does not suggest that statistical knowledge, or the awareness of
true randomness, can protect people from developing faulty gambling cognitions
(Benhsain et al. 2004). Despite the limited empirical support for awareness/information
campaigns, they remain the most commonly implemented model (Williams et al. 2007).
This trend suggests that prevention efforts may suffer from an overemphasis on the role
of cognitions, while minimizing the influence of other factors.
Limitations
Participants from the MLSYA were young adults recruited from Manitoba, Canada. The
demographic characteristics of the sample were not representative of either the Manitoban
population or the Canadian young adult population. This limits the ability of the findings to
be broadly applied to other populations.
Other potential limitations in this study include the transient nature of problem gamblers
and attrition. Problem gambling has been demonstrated to have a transient nature, with
natural recovery often coinciding with maturation into adulthood (Slutske et al. 2003;
Winters et al. 2005). With high rates of natural recovery and low rates of treatment seeking
(Slutske 2006), it is relatively common for gamblers to oscillate between pathological and
non-pathological gambling states (Winters et al. 2002). Young adulthood is a period of
development where multiple risk-taking behaviors are common, yet most of this age group
will mature out of this behavior with age (Jessor 1998). This pattern suggests that the
elevated pathological gambling prevalence seen in young adults (Shaffer and Hall 2000;
Shaffer et al. 1999; Volberg 1996) may be reflective of a transient state. With this transient
nature in mind, it is possible that the drop in gambling severity seen in this study’s
longitudinal analyzes could be partially due to participants oscillating between gambling
risk states.
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Conclusions
Our study provides insight towards the development of increased problem gambling
severity in light of related faulty gambling cognitions. The findings of the current study
highlight the simultaneous development of problem gambling and faulty beliefs although,
over time, problem gambling severity may lead to erroneous beliefs more so than erro-
neous beliefs leading to problem gambling. In light of these findings, targeting erroneous
beliefs as a means of preventing future problem gambling behavior may have limited
effectiveness. This notion has been previously supported by findings that directing pre-
vention efforts at gambling beliefs has a transitory effect on behaviors with no change from
baseline observed after a 30 day period (Wohl and Sztainert 2010).
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